There is a formal equivalence between games, societies, and economies.
I. Introduction
The fagt that an economy with public goods may be treated as a private goods economy in a commodity space of higher dimension was noted by Arrow (1969) and later exploited by others, including Starrett (1973) , Rader (1972) and Bergstrom (1976) . Here we develop this notion systematically by demonstrating the equivalence of the notions of game, society, and economy. This enables us to define Lindahl ecLuilibrium for a game or society in such a way as to correspond to competitive equilibrium for the equivalent economy. In view of this equivalence, theorems on the existence of Lindahl equilibrium become straightforward corollaries of theorems on the existence of competitive equilibria for the corresponding economies. We show that the notion of a core for a game or society derived by extension from the core of the equivalent economy is relatively uninteresting since it is "too large." We then study the a-core of Scarf (1971) for a game or society. We show by example that the a-core and the set of Lindaht equilibria may be disjoint. This extends and sharpens the observation of Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Bergstrom (1975) An example of a society is the following. Imagine a village with n citizens each of whom pursues the sole activity of driving an automobile through the village streets. Although each citizen loves to drive, they all abhor the congestion and pollution due to traffic. Assume that each citizen does not care which of his fellow citizens are driving, so long as the total amount of driving by others is fixed. For each i, suppose that any possible amount of driving by i can be represented by a number in the closed real interval [0, ai] . To model our. village as a society we represent the action of a citizen i who drives z~ hours by an n + 1 vector xx with an entry of zl in the ith coordinate and in the n + 1 coordinate with zeroes elsewhere. Then define the action set of iasX/= ((0,... ,O, zi, O,... ,O,zi) eR n + 2 0<= z/<__ai).
Then for any social state xeY.X/, the ith component reports the amount of driving by i while the n + 1 component reports the total amount of driving summed over all citizens. Thus preference levels are fully specified by the choice of a point in X = ZX i. In fact, the preference relation R~ will in this example have the property that R~ ~ ((y, z) 
Slightly less obvious is the fact that with an appropriate expansion of the dimension of the space in which it is embedded, a game can be regarded as a society. This is formalized below.
Remark 2. There is a one to one mapping from the set of n person games on a linear space Z g into the set of n person societies on (Lg) n (the n-fold Cartesian product of Lg), such that the game (Y1, n n general as that of a game or a society. Our definition of an economy is similar to that of Debreu (1959) . However we attach production possibility sets directly to individuals rather than to firms whose ownership is partitioned among individuals. Where production possibility sets are convex, these two approaches are equivalent, as has been observed by Rader (1972) and Nikaido (1968) . The procedure used here leads to a less cumbersome treatment of game theoretic notions. 
zi ~ X Ti ).
3. For i = 1 .... , n, the preference relation of Agent/is R~ c C/X C/.
Condition (3) deserves further explanation. The total consumption of the economy is ~; z i. According to conditon (3), the total consumption must be equal to the sum of some production in the economy. In effect, exchange of commodities entails no cost. It turns out that every society and every game is "equivalent to" an economy. This is the basic result of Rader (1973) and is stated formally as remarks 3 and 4. We also examine the somewhat tangential but very interesting question of when an economy is equivalent to a society or game. Remarks 5 and 6 contains an answer to this question. Verification of each of these remarks is straightforward. 
The obvious way to "make an economy into a society" is to allow individuals to "allocate" their production among the agents. Thus for each i we
~z. might make X i = {(zia ..... z],) I ]ii eTi )
where zijis the amount ofi's production allocated to ]. For xeZXi, the ]th component X i ofX would represent the total vector of production allocated to ]. Thus it would be natural to assign preferences R, s. so that xR~x' if and only ifx~R~.x~. The only snag here is that for this procedure to work smoothly we must ensure that x i and x~ belong to the consumption set C~. This we achieve by allowing only non-negative transfers and by assuming that each C~ is the nonnegative orthant of L e so that no individual can be "forced out of his consumption set" by admissable transfers from others. Remarks 5 and 6 explicate the situation formally.
Remark 5. Let L~_ be the non-negative orthant of an ordered linear space. There is a one to one mapping from the set of n person economies on L e for which C i = Le+ for i = 1,..., n into the set of societies on (Le) n such that the economy (C1 ..... Cn, T1, . . . , T n, Re~, .., Ren) is identified with the society (Xx, • • •, X n , RS~, ~.., RSn ) where:
1. X i = (zie (Le+) n [zi=(zil .... ,zin) and
Remark 6. Let L e+. be the non-negative orthant of an ordered linear space. There is a one to one m.apping from the set of n person economies on L e for which Ci = L~ for i = 1 . . . . . n into the set of games on ( 
III. Competitive equilibrium and Lindahl equilibrium.
The equivalence of economies, games, and societies enables us to extend results in competitive theory to the theory of games and societies. 
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In Lindahl equilibrium for either a society or a game, each individual has his own price vector used to evaluate the final social state. His "budget set" consists of those social states whose "cost" at his own prices does not exceed the value of his own activity valued at the sum of the prices of all agents.
Remark 7. If a society or a game is equivalent to an economy as in remark 3 or remark 4, then a competitive equilibrium for the economy is a Lindahl equilibrium for the game or society. Remark 7 can be verified as a direct consequence of the definitions. An immediate consequence of remark 7 is:
Remark ,8. If a society or game is equivalent to an economy for which competitive equilibrium exists, then there exists a Lindahl equilibrium for the society or game.
We can extend the fundamental results on the relation between Pareto optima and competitive equilibria for economies to that between Pareto optima and Lindahl equilibria for games and sdcieties. By direct application of the technique used to prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium we have:
Remark 9. If preferences of all agents are locally non-satiated, a Lindahl equilibrium for a game or a society is Pareto optimal.
It is easy to show that a Pareto optimal outcome or social state for a game or a society corresponds to a Pareto optimum for the equivalent economy. If the "second theorem of welfare economics" applies to the equivalent economy, then this Pareto optimum for the economy is a competitive equilibrium given an appropriate distribution of wealth. It is easy to show as a consequence of Remark 7 that the original Pareto optimum for the game or social state is also a Lindahl equilibrium for a game or social state obtained by a transformation of the origin of the original game or social state. This result is made explicit as:
Remark 10. If a game or society is equivalent to an economy for which the "second theorem of welfare economics" applies, then any Pareto optimal outcome or social state for the game or society is a Lindahl equilibrium outcome or social state for the game or society obtained by translating the coordinates of the original game or society so that the specified Pareto optimum becomes the origin.
Since the equivalence mappings of Remarks 3 and 4 preserve convexity and closedness of sets in a linear topological space, the equivalent economy will inherit properties of convexity and continuity assumed for a game or. society. Therefore in a game or a society, we assume continuity and convexity of preferences and closedness and convexity of strategy sets or actions sets, along with certain technical assumptions to deal with "boundary problems", then we can be assured that in the equivalent economy, competitive equilibrium will exist and the second theorem of welfare economics will hold. Thus the applicability of remarks 9 and 10 is established. These matters are treated in Rader (1973) and in more detail in Bergstrom (1976) .
IV. The "core" in economies, games, and societies A. The "core"as extended from an equivalent economy A well known result of Shapley (in Rader, 1972 , or Nikaido, 1968 is that every competitive equilibrium belongs to the core of an economy. If the core of a game or society were defined to consist of those outcomes or social situations that correspond under the mappings of Remarks 3 and 4 to points in the core of the equivalent economy, then the Lindahl equilibria which according to Remarks 7 and 8 correspond to the competitive equilibria would belong to the core. This procedure, however, leads to a core which is too large to be of interest. Indeed it turns out that the core would then contain all Pareto optima which are Pareto superior to the outcome in which all agents undertake the zero strategy. This result is stated formally as Remark 11 for the case of a society. A similar remark applies to games. The core of the economy is the set of allocations which are feasible and which can be improved on by no coalition K C ( 1 .... , n ).
Remark 11. If a Society S is equivalent to an economy E, then the set of social states in S which correspond to allocations in the core of E is the set of Pareto optimal social states xeS such that xR~ 0 for all ie/.
The proof of Remark i 1 is straightforward once it is observed from the construction of the sets C i and Ti in the equivalent economy that for any coalition K C (i .., n }, ~ C. (3 Z Tj = 0. Thus coalitions other than # '" jeK I [eK ( 1 ..... n) are unable to improve on the situation in which each agent undertakes the zero activity.
B. The a-core
In view of Remark 11, we must look elsewhere for an interesting notion of the "core" of a game or society. One such alternative, the a-core, is due to Scarf(1971) . In order to improve on allocation in the sense of the a core, a coalition must be able to assign alternative strategies to its members in such a way that regardless of the responses in the complementary coalition, no member of the coalition is made worse off and at least one member benefits. This is formalized as follows. Scarf shows that where Y is convex and compact and where each R~ represents continuous, convex preferences the a core is non empty. In view of remark 1 and Scarf's result we can assert:
Remark 12. In a society where for all ieL X i is convex and compact and R ~ represents continuous, convex preferences, the a core is non-empty.
The a core, however, has at least two features which are undesirable for our purposes. Let the game be one in which many agents are able to inflict severe damages on others. Then the conservative nature of the blocking criterion is such that the a core turns out to be httle less than the set of Pareto optimal social states. In fact the a core may even include social states which are worse for some agents than the initial state OeX. Also, where there are asymmetries in the possibilities for agents to damage others, the a core may exclude the Lindahl equilibrium social states. The difficulties are illustrated in the following example.
Example 1
This example can be thought of as a two person game in which each participant performs.an activity which he enjoys but which distresses the other. Formally, let Y1 and Y~ be the closed real intervals [0, a] and [0, b] . Preferences of Agents 1 and 2 are represented by the utility functions, Figure 1 illustrates this discussion for the case where a = b = 3. The dashed lines are indifference curves as labelled. The heavy line is the locus of Pareto efficient points, the segment AB is the t~-core and the segment CD is the set Pareto efficient points which are preferred by both agents to the outcome (0, 0). The point E is the only Lindahl equilibrium outcome.
To show that the set of Lindahl equilibria and the ~-core may be disjoint, consider the case where a = 3 and b = 2. According to our previous discussion, the only Lindahl equilibrium outcome is (yl, yz) = (1, 1). For any outcome in the t~-core, u a (yx,y~) >= u ~ (a, b) = u a (3,2) = 1. But u a (1, 1) 1 = -. Thus the (unique) Lindahl equilibrium is not in the s-core and we have 2 the promised example. Figure 2 illustrates this case. The Lindahl equilibrium is the point E and the ~-core is the segment AB.
C. The core when damage is limited by law or technology
We now consider a fairly strong core property that Lindahl equilibrium does have. While this discussion concerns societies, parallel results for games can be obtained as a straightforward application of Remark 1.
For an n person society, Lindahl prices ~-= (i61 ..... i6 n) can be used to compute "values" of the actions of one coalition to another.
Definition 10. Where the actions of the agents are xl .... ,Xn, the benefit value of the actions of coalition S to the complementary coalition, -S, is defined as:
~S (F,x~,... ,
x,,)=(ie_SP )tieSXi).
It turns out that in Lindahl equilibrium, for every coalition S the benefit value of the actions of S to ~S equals the benefit value of the actions of ~S to S. Furthermore if another social situation improves on Lindahl equilibrium for some coalition S, then in the proposed social situation the benefit value of the actions of ~S to S exceeds the benefit value of actions of S to ~S. This suggests that Lindahl equilibrium is really a social exchange equilibrium. These results are stated formally in the next remark. 
